Executive-legislative relationship in brazilian coalition presidentialism: the agenda of the government Dilma Rousseff (2011 - 2016)

The impeachment process of former President Dilma Rousseff (PT) and the political uncertainties for the coming years have rescued the debate on the Brazilian institutional design, especially regarding the Executive-Legislative relationship and the cost that the Executive would have to approve its ag...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rubiatti, Bruno de Castro, Pereira, Fabiano da Silva
Format: Online
Language:Portuguese
Published: Universidade Estadual de Campinas 2019
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Online Access:https://econtents.sbu.unicamp.br/inpec/index.php/tematicas/article/view/11611
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Summary:The impeachment process of former President Dilma Rousseff (PT) and the political uncertainties for the coming years have rescued the debate on the Brazilian institutional design, especially regarding the Executive-Legislative relationship and the cost that the Executive would have to approve its agenda in front of the Legislature. For some, the mix between presidentialism and multi-party system leads to a difficult equation dilemma. Others point to the capacity of the Brazilian institutional arrangement to produce decisions through mechanisms of cooperation and conflict resolution. The debate, therefore, remains open. The purpose of this article is to feed the discussions on the executive agenda through a study of the legislative proposals initiated by Dilma Rousseff’s administration between January 2011 and May 11, 2016 (the removal of the former president happened on 12 May). We analyzed 341 proposals, distributed in: Provisional Measures (MPV), Constitutional Amendment Proposals (PEC), Law Projects (PL) and Complementary Law Projects (PLP). We also take into account the nature of the propositions, the success rate, the processing time and the use of the presidential veto.
ISSN:2595-315X